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In 1997, Margaret Brazier was asked by the then Government to chair a
review of the laws regulating surrogacy. The subsequent Brazier Report
made a number of recommendations, including the need for greater
regulation and the tightening of ‘expenses’ payments. Fifteen years on,
the limitations in the legal regulation of surrogacy have become increas-
ingly clear. Yet, none of Brazier’s recommendations have been adopted,
despite the clear opportunity for revisiting the regulation of surrogacy
offered during the passage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act (2008). In this paper, we revisit the Brazier Report in the light of
subsequent developments and assess to what extent its key findings
remain salient. Brazier’s recommendations will thus provide a
jumping off point for a critical analysis of the current state of the law
regarding surrogacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1997, Margaret Brazier was asked by the then Labour Govern-
ment to chair a review of the laws regulating surrogacy. The subsequent
Brazier Review made a number of recommendations, strongly arguing
the need for greater and tighter regulation.1 Fifteen years on, the law
governing surrogacy remains confused, incoherent, and poorly
adapted to the specific realities of the practice of surrogacy. Yet, al-
though the limitations in the legal framework have become ever more
apparent, and notwithstanding the clear opportunity for revisiting the
1 Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Pay-
ments and Regulation, Report of the Review Team Cm 4068 (HMSO,
London 1998), hereinafter, ‘Brazier Review’. The three members of the
Review Committee were Professors Margaret Brazier (Chair), Alastair Camp-
bell, and Susan Golombok.
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regulation of surrogacy offered by the passage of the Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Act (2008), to date not one of the Brazier
Review’s recommendations has been formally implemented.
In this paper, we revisit the Brazier Review in the light of subsequent
developments and assess to what extent its key findings remain salient.
The Review’s recommendations thus provide a jumping off point for a
critical analysis of the current state of the law of surrogacy in the UK.
We argue that the law remains severely flawed in a number of respects,
many of which were clearly indicated in the Review. Specifically, we
suggest that the current law falls far short of offering a sensible means
of achieving the key objective of the protection of the needs of children
and other vulnerable parties involved in a surrogacy arrangement. Even
if the majority of surrogacy arrangements pass without incident, there is
nonetheless a pressing case for a regulatory framework that is able to
deal effectively with the serious problems that have arisen in the remain-
ing minority of cases.2
We begin by providing some context to the Brazier Review and out-
lining its remit, before going on to focus in turn on what we would
see as the three key areas of concern: regulation, payment, and parent-
hood. We suggest that, within each area, many of the problems identi-
fied in the Review persist today and, indeed, in some significant
respects have been exacerbated. We also consider the Review’s sugges-
tions for change in each case, before drawing our own conclusions
regarding the need for reform.
II. THE BRAZIER REVIEW: CONTEXT AND REMIT
Surrogacy has a long history as a practice, dating back to, at least,
Biblical times.3 However, little was heard of surrogacy in the UK
until the late 1970s, when the first case reached the English
courts.4 The practice then became increasingly widely known with
the well-publicised cases of ‘Baby Cotton’ in the UK and ‘Baby M’
in the USA in the 1980s.5 Surrogacy has provoked a variety of
responses since its emergence as part of the ‘reproductive revolution’
2 The incidence of surrogacy and attendant problems are unknown, but the
COTS website notes that 98% of arrangements involving COTS members
have been successful, with a milestone 500th birth achieved in 2004: ,http://
www.surrogacy.org.uk/FAQ4.htm. accessed 7 July 2011.
3 Genesis 16:1–16 and 30:1–25.
4 A v C (1978) 8 Fam Law 170, [1985] FLR 445.
5 Cotton was paid £6,500 for acting as a surrogate for a foreign couple, who had
used an American commercial agency: Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy)
[1985] 2 FLR 846; Mary-Beth Whitehead sparked controversy when she fled
with the baby she had agreed to give birth to for a wealthy couple, crossing
inter-state boundaries in the process: In the matter of Baby M (1988) 537 A
2d 1227.
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of this period.6 At this time, many feminist and other commentators
viewed it as representative of male control over reproduction,7 as ex-
ploitative of women and as wrongly treating reproductive capacity or,
still worse, children as a commodity.8 However, though some com-
pared it with prostitution9 or even slavery,10 others saw surrogacy
as an acceptable means of reproduction and an expression of
women’s procreative autonomy.11 Today, while some disagreement
regarding the ethics of surrogacy persists, it is fair to say the
balance of views has gradually shifted in a direction which is less
hostile to surrogacy, with the practice becoming increasingly accepted
in the UK.12
Specific statutory regulation of surrogacy has existed in the UK since
the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, which was introduced following
the recommendations of the Warnock Committee,13 which had been
established in 1982 to look into the ethical implications of developments
in human reproduction. The Warnock Report was highly critical of sur-
rogacy, considering that courts would, in the event of a dispute, treat
‘most, if not all surrogacy arrangements as contrary to public
policy’.14 For the majority of the Committee, any possible benefits of
the practice failed to outweigh the ethical objection that the surrogate
was being used merely as a means to an end.15 Whilst rejecting the
application of criminal penalties to the main parties to a surrogacy ar-
rangement (famously, in order to avoid children being born to
6 R Lee and D Morgan, Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Regulating the
Reproductive Revolution (Blackstone Press, London 2001) 191.
7 To take just one example: G Corea (ed), ManMade Women: How Reproduct-
ive Technologies Affect Women (Indiana University Press, Bloomington
1987). Here, and elsewhere, limitations of space mean that we are able only
to give indicative references to the expansive literature regarding surrogacy.
8 Eg M Radin, ‘Market Inaliability’ (1987) 100 Harvard LR 1849.
9 Especially A Dworkin, Right Wing Women (Women’s Press, London 1983).
10 Eg ML Shanley, ‘“Surrogate Mothering” and Women’s Freedom: A Critique
of Contracts for Human Reproduction’ in P Boling (ed), Expecting Trouble:
Surrogacy, Fetal Abuse and New Reproductive Technologies (Westview
Press, Oxford 1995) 156, 165.
11 Eg R Macklin, ‘Is There Anything Wrong With Surrogate Motherhood? An
Ethical Analysis’ (1988) 16 (1–2) Law Med Health Care 60.
12 Eg Derek Morgan describes the practice as ‘socially and ethically divisive
because it does not attract universal opprobrium, because it may be seen,
and is seen by some, as a natural and beneficial product of the reproduction
revolution as much as an unnatural and abnormal artefact of it’. D Morgan
‘Enigma Variations: Surrogacy, Rights and Procreative Tourism’ in R Cook, S
Day-Sclater and F Kaganas, Surrogate Motherhood: International Perspec-
tives (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) 75.
13 Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, Report
(Cmnd 9314, HMSO, London 1984).
14 Ibid, para 8.5.
15 Ibid, para 8.17 (and see 8.10–8.12).
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mothers subject to a ‘taint of criminality’16), the majority of the
Warnock Committee thus advocated for the implementation of a legis-
lative framework under which surrogacy agencies were illegal,17 and
‘which strongly discouraged surrogacy arrangements, made transparent
society’s disapproval of surrogacy as a practice, and limited resort to
surrogacy arrangements to, at most, a handful of instances where a rela-
tive or a close friend would agree to act as a surrogate on an altruistic
basis’.18
The subsequent Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 prohibited com-
mercial surrogacy, but stopped short of criminalising the parties to a
surrogacy arrangement. The Act had ‘two disparate goals’: to protect
vulnerable women and children and to discourage the practice of
surrogacy.19 In 1990, the Act was amended to implement another of
Warnock’s recommendations: that all surrogacy arrangements should
be unenforceable.20 However, in addition, a more positive recognition
of surrogacy was also introduced: ‘intending parents’ were allowed to
formalise their relationship with their children through the award of a
Parental Order.21 This provided for a form of fast-track adoption, avail-
able only in certain, limited circumstances as we explore further below.
Thus, when the Brazier Review Committee began its work, surrogacy
was already an ‘accepted’ form of assisted reproduction,22 with a rudi-
mentary framework for its regulation in place. However, this framework
had met wide-ranging criticism,23 and a review was judged opportune
for a number of reasons.24 First, while concerns regarding the protection
of the often highly vulnerable participants in surrogacy arrangements
16 Ibid, para 8.19.
17 Ibid, para 8.18.
18 A dissenting minority argued that facilitative regulation was necessary to
protect the interests of all parties. See above n 13, Expression of Dissent:
A. Surrogacy.
19 E Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy
(Hart, Oxford 2001) 262.
20 S 36, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, inserting s 1A into the
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985.
21 S 30 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (now s 54 of the 2008
Act). We use the term ‘surrogate’ for the woman who gestates the pregnancy
and ‘intending parents’ for those who enter into surrogacy arrangements with
the intention of raising the resulting child. For consistency, we use this de-
scription also to apply after birth, to those who are now actively parenting
a child conceived in this way.
22 Brazier Review, para 4.5, noting the existence of such acceptance ‘across a
wide spectrum of opinion’.
23 Eg, Brazier has elsewhere noted, with regard to the criminal prohibitions on
commercial surrogacy put in place by the 1985 Act, that Warnock’s recom-
mendations were ‘hastily and ham-fistedly hurried through Parliament’: M
Brazier, ‘Regulating the Reproduction Business’ (1999) 7 Med L Rev 169.
24 Brazier Review, paras 1.6–1.13.
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remained, the practice of surrogacy was visibly increasing. Infertility
clinics had become gradually more involved and many were providing
IVF surrogacy services,25 doctors had become more accepting of the
procedure,26 and surrogacy stories (both positive and negative) were be-
coming more common in the media.27 Secondly, some of the more
unusual cases, particularly those involving intra-familial surrogacy,28
were seen as raising novel issues regarding the welfare of potential chil-
dren. Thirdly, the ban on commercialisation of surrogacy was hard to
enforce, with the levels of payments to surrogates thought to be increas-
ing.29 And, finally, one highly publicised case provided a particular
impetus for reform: Karen Roche publicly changed her mind after agree-
ing to act as a surrogate for a Dutch couple, first claiming untruthfully
that she had had a termination and later stating concerns over their suit-
ability as parents as a reason for refusing to give up the child.30
The Review Committee was thus tasked with reviewing the existing
law and practice relating to the making of surrogacy arrangements in
order ‘to ensure that the law continued to meet public concerns’.31
The Committee’s terms of reference were, first, to consider whether pay-
ments, including expenses, to surrogate mothers should continue to be
allowed and, if so, on what basis; secondly, to examine whether there
was a case for the regulation of surrogacy arrangements through a recog-
nised body or bodies and, if so, to advise on the scope and operation of
such arrangements; and, finally, in the light of the above, to advise
whether changes were needed to the existing statutory framework regu-
lating surrogacy.32 The Committee’s remit was thus closely bounded
and, specifically, it excluded two principles that formed cornerstones
of the existing regulatory regime: the prohibition of commercialisation
and the non-enforceability of surrogacy contracts.
We now move on to analyse some specific problems with the law on
surrogacy, the recommendations made by Brazier to address them and
developments since the Brazier Review in each of three key areas: the
regulatory framework, payments to surrogates, and parenthood.
25 Ibid, para 1.7.
26 BMA, Changing Conceptions of Motherhood: The Practice of Surrogacy in
Britain (BMA, London 1996).
27 Brazier Review, paras 1.8–1.12.
28 Ibid, para 1.12.
29 COTS suggested in its evidence to the Brazier Review that payments of
£15,000 or more were being made by commissioning couples to surrogate
mothers. Brazier Review, para 5.4.
30 Anon, ‘Biological father to fight for custody of surrogate baby’ ,http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/21009.stm. (accessed 7 October 2011).
31 Brazier Review, para 1.1.
32 Ibid, para 1.2.
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III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
In discussing the regulation of surrogacy, the distinction between full
and partial surrogacy must first be emphasised: while these practices
might be thought to raise many of the same social and ethical issues,
their highly divergent treatment in law renders the incoherence of the
regulatory framework immediately apparent. Full surrogacy, where
the surrogate gestates a child that is not genetically her own, of ne-
cessity involves the creation of an ex utero embryo using IVF and
will, by virtue of this fact, fall within the complex and stringent
regulatory framework laid down by the Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Act 1990 (the 1990 Act), as amended.33 The 1990 Act and
its accompanying Code of Practice inter alia lay down specific and
very detailed consent requirements;34 mandate the offer of counsel-
ling for those receiving treatment;35 and provide that clinics must
take account of any future child’s welfare before agreeing to
provide treatment.36 Partial surrogacy, where the surrogate contri-
butes her egg as well as gestating the child, will often fall
out- with this regulatory framework (e.g. where the sperm of the
intending father is used to fertilise the surrogate outside of a licensed
clinic). For such ‘informal’ arrangements, there are no rules govern-
ing access to treatment; while organisations such as childlessness
overcome through surrogacy (COTS) have their own medical screen-
ing procedures,37 the use of fresh sperm may nonetheless raise the
prospect of infection; there is no formal data collection regarding
the incidence of births; and no legal requirement for the provision
of counselling. Access to professional expertise is very limited, not
least (as we discuss further below) because the ban on commercial
involvement makes it illegal for surrogacy agencies to charge for ser-
vices.38 The means by which surrogacy is achieved also has signifi-
cant implications for the question of legal parenthood, as we
consider below.
One commentator has welcomed this lack of regulation as a means of
avoiding ‘medical and social work imperialism’39 but, as the Brazier
33 S 3.
34 S12, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended) and s 5 of
the Code of Practice (8th edn, 2009, revised April 2010).
35 S 13, the 1990 Act and s 3, Code of Practice, ibid.
36 S 13(5), the 1990 Act (as amended) and s 8, Code of Practice, ibid.
37 See ,http://www.surrogacy.org.uk/support2.htm. accessed 7 October
2011.
38 Although such organisations may charge ‘membership fees’ and accept dona-
tions. See also the text accompanying n 54.
39 M Freeman, ‘Does Surrogacy Have a Future after Brazier?’ (1999) 7 Med L
Rev 1.
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Review recognised, the regulatory vacuum in which partial surrogacy
operates can leave vulnerable parties unprotected.40 This raises concerns
both with regard to the possible exploitation of surrogates who, the
Review suggested, might be induced to act in an injurious way by the
prospect of large payments, and with regard to infertile couples, desper-
ate in their desire for children, who might equally suffer at the hands of
an unscrupulous surrogate. And, finally and most significantly, the lack
of regulatory oversight raised concerns for the welfare of any children
born as a result of surrogacy arrangements.
Responding to these concerns, the Brazier Review considered a
number of alternative systems that could be introduced to regulate the
practice of surrogacy. It rejected the idea, advanced by the British Fertil-
ity Society, that surrogacy should be brought within the ambit of the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and take
place only in licensed clinics. The HFEA itself had argued that ‘the
nature of the regulation required for surrogacy agencies is outside the
HFEA’s remit and expertise’,41 and the Review agreed, noting that sur-
rogacy was a ‘practice involving social and ethical questions of a differ-
ent kind and order to other forms of assisted conception’,42 being in
many respects more akin to adoption.43 As such, the Review recom-
mended a different option: the establishment of not-for-profit surrogacy
agencies that should be registered with the Department of Health and
operate within a statutory Code of Practice, established under the
terms of a new Surrogacy Act, which would replace existing legislation.
The Code of Practice would be binding upon all registered surrogacy
agencies, as well as providing advice for any party concerned with sur-
rogacy, including those entering into private arrangements.44
The Review’s proposed new Surrogacy Act would, however, continue
what the Review Committee had considered to be the best elements of
the existing legislation: namely the prohibition of commercial surrogacy
and non-enforceability of surrogacy arrangements. While this acceptance
of the ongoing non-enforceability of surrogacy contracts stayed carefully
within the confines of the Committee’s remit, the Committee also recom-
mended that a ‘memorandum of understanding’ should be drawn up
between parties to a surrogate arrangement.45 Though the non-contractual
character of such a memorandum was emphasised,46 this recommendation
nonetheless demonstrates a keen awareness of the vulnerability of both
40 Brazier Review, para 6.5.
41 Ibid, para 6.18.
42 Ibid, para 7.9.
43 Ibid, para 6.13.
44 Ibid, para 7.18.
45 Ibid, para 6.25.
46 Ibid., para. 8.14.
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surrogate and intending parents should either of the parties to a surrogacy
arrangement have a change of heart or circumstance.
In the years since the Review, the empirical realities of the practice of
surrogacy remain hazy, with no way of accurately judging its true inci-
dence. What estimates there are suggest that surrogacy has probably
remained reasonably rare: the voluntary organisation, Surrogacy UK,
notes only ‘over 700’ successful births following surrogacy in the UK
since 1985,47 and, as we noted above, a large number of these surrogacy
arrangements appear to pass without dispute.48 However, analysis of
those cases which do arrive in the courts suggests significant and
ongoing problems, some of which might clearly have been avoided
through better regulatory oversight.
Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile),49 a partial surrogacy arrange-
ment involving a British surrogate mother and intending parents from
Turkey, provides a case in point. Having been poorly advised by a sur-
rogacy agency, the intending parents had applied for a Parental Order
but found themselves unable to obtain one because neither was domi-
ciled in the UK, as required by the legislation.50 While the judge
found a way for the couple to return to Turkey with the child, he was
trenchant in his criticism of the role played by COTS,51 and the lack
of any oversight of their activities:
[t]he court’s understanding is that surrogacy agencies such as COTS
are not covered by any statutory or regulatory umbrella and are
therefore not required to perform to any recognised standard of
competence. I am sufficiently concerned by the information uncov-
ered . . . to question whether some form of inspection or authorisa-
tion should be required in order to improve the quality of advice
that is given to individuals who seek to achieve the birth of a
child through surrogacy. Given the importance of the issues
involved when the life of a child is created in this manner, it is ques-
tionable whether the role of facilitating surrogacy arrangements
should be left to groups of well meaning amateurs.52
47 ,http://www.surrogacyuk.org/Index.html. accessed 21 June 2011.
48 COTS claim a success rate of over 98%, with failures ‘few and far between’.
See G Dodd, ‘Surrogacy and the Law in Britain: Users’ Perspectives’ in Cook
and others, above n 12, 113.
49 [2007] EWHC 2814.
50 S 30, the 1990 Act (now S 54, the 2008 Act).
51 COTS aims to provide help, advice, and support to surrogates and intended
parents. It no longer accepts couples from outside the UK: ,http://www.
surrogacy.org.uk/About_COTS.html. accessed 12 July 2011. The court
granted an application under s 84 of the Adoption & Children Act 2002,
allowing the child to be adopted in Turkey.
52 At 29.
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It should be noted here that, whatever its ethical merits, the prohib-
ition of commercialisation might be argued to exacerbate these pro-
blems: the prohibition on undertaking their work on a paid basis
provides limited scope for agencies like COTS to attempt to profes-
sionalise their services, leaving them no real alternative but to
operate, in Macfarlane J’s words, as ‘well meaning amateurs’. As
he further noted, ‘COTS is an organisation run on very limited
resources by a group of volunteers’.53
As outlined above, the Review had suggested a system of registra-
tion, inspection, and regulatory oversight that might have gone
some way to addressing these problems. Allowing not-for-profit agen-
cies to charge for their work would also make it easier for them to
professionalise their services and a licensing body and Code of Prac-
tice might have entrenched legal guidance in a way that could have
helped to avoid the very basic error made in Re G. Some limited
reform in this direction was introduced by the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act 2008, which exempted certain services offered
on a not-for-profit basis from the current legal prohibition. These
changes mean that agencies like COTS can now receive ‘reasonable
payment’ to recoup costs attributable to initiating negotiations with
a view to making surrogacy arrangement (e.g. charging for introduc-
tions) and compiling information regarding surrogacy (e.g. maintain-
ing lists of people wishing to commission, or to act as, a surrogate).54
Although this represents some recognition of the problem, the distinc-
tion between precisely which services may be subject to charge and
which may not is a fine one and the reform stops far short of offering
a complete solution. Overall, the statutory response to this issue
might be best described as ‘tinkering with the existing legal provi-
sions’,55 rather than subjecting them to any serious reconsideration.
Margaret Brazier has further criticised the reform as legitimising the
role of surrogacy agencies without any process for registering or con-
trolling their activities.56
Over a decade on from the Review, then, the law evidently continues
to suffer from problems which it had noted. The extent of the practice of
surrogacy remains largely unknown and the regulatory framework
leaves the courts struggling to devise the means of protecting the
53 At 18.
54 S 59, the 2008 Act.
55 House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on the Human Tissue
and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Vol 1: Report, Session 2006–2007, HL Paper
169-I, HC Paper 630-I (July 2007), para 44. See further M Fox, ‘The
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: Tinkering at the Margins’
(2009) 17(3) Feminist Legal Stud 333.
56 Evidence given to the Joint Committee, cited ibid, para 285.
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parties to surrogacy arrangements when something goes wrong.57 In its
2004 report on human reproductive technologies, the House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee had also noted some of
these concerns and recommended that the Government should review
surrogacy within the context of any overall assessment of the 1990
Act.58 It suggested starting with the Review’s recommendations and a
review of further developments since 1998. The Government’s subse-
quent consultation regarding the 1990 Act did include an entire
section on surrogacy, detailing the Review’s recommendations, and
asking three very general questions: ‘what, if any, changes are needed
to the law and regulation as it relates to surrogacy?’; ‘if changes to the
law and regulation on surrogacy are necessary, do the recommendations
of the ‘Brazier Report’ represent the best way forward?’, and, finally, ‘if
changes to the law and regulation are necessary, should they be taken
forward as part of the review of the Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Act, or in separate legislation?’.59 Yet, any willingness to revisit
the law of surrogacy appears to have evaporated during the reform
process. Other than the minor amendments noted above, the only
further reforms introduced specifically with surrogacy in mind were
some small changes to the criteria for a Parental Order (discussed
below). As the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, charged with review-
ing the changes introduced in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act (2008) concluded, the reforms did not ‘go far enough to protect
both children born as a result of surrogacy and surrogate mothers’.60
Again, however, the recommendation that the Bill be amended to
bring the regulation of surrogacy within the remit of the HFEA fell on
deaf ears.
IV. PAYMENTS TO SURROGATES
The question of whether it is possible to countenance paying a fee to sur-
rogate mothers is, perhaps, the key ethical issue which has excited most
discussion of surrogacy.61 While the general question of the ban on com-
mercialisation was outside the Brazier Review’s remit, surrogate
mothers were (and, indeed, still are) entitled to receive reimbursement
for ‘genuine expenses’ incurred in connection with the surrogacy
57 See eg Re G, above n 49 and the further cases discussed at nn 79–83.
58 Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, Fifth Report of Session,
2004–2005, HC 7-1, paras 310–2.
59 Department of Health, ‘Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act: A Public Consultation’ (2005) 7.17–7.19.
60 Joint Committee, above n 55, para 289.
61 Eg E Blyth and C Potter, ‘Paying for It? Surrogacy, Market Forces and
Assisted Conception’ in Cook and others, above n 14, 227–42.
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arrangement.62 The Committee was specifically asked to consider
whether such payments to surrogate mothers should continue to be
allowed and, if so, on what basis.63
The Brazier Review found that, notwithstanding the prohibition, ‘sur-
rogacy is, in effect, increasingly practised on a commercial basis’,64 with
surrogates being paid ‘in excess of any reasonable level of actual
expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy’.65 The Review cited pay-
ments of up to £15,000.66 This reflected a problem in enforcement: no
criminal offence is committed by either the surrogate mother or the
intending parents if payments are made. The enforcement mechanism
lies in the possible refusal of a Parental Order,67 yet as the Review noted:
[w]e are not aware of any case in which an application has been
refused on the grounds that an unacceptably large sum of money
has been paid to the surrogate mother by the commissioning
couple. From the evidence that we have received . . . it is clear that
in many cases a component of the amount paid to the surrogate
mother is a direct payment for services rendered rather than the
reimbursement of actual expenses.68
The Review Committee was clearly concerned by this state of affairs. It
assumed that it would be in the best interests of the child and the parties
to limit payments and that surrogacy arrangements were more likely to
end successfully if they were entered into on an altruistic basis.69 It also
assumed that ‘many [surrogates] are primarily motivated by payment,
particularly those who have no previous connection with the commis-
sioning couple’,70 and expressed ‘reservations about facilitating a situ-
ation whereby some relatively poor and less educated women are
having babies for their wealthier and better educated counterparts’.71
It suggested that the potential for the surrogate to extort money
from the intending parents would be lessened if payment was
62 S 54(8), the 2008 Act.
63 Brazier Review, para 5.1.
64 Ibid, para 1.13.
65 Ibid, para 3.20.
66 Ibid, para 5.4.
67 Ibid, para 5.2.
68 Ibid, para 5.3.
69 Emily Jackson points out that assumptions were made without supporting
evidence, above n 19 at 284. Freeman has argued that Brazier’s approach
risked driving surrogacy underground: above n 39 at 10.
70 Brazier Review, para 5.14. However, see H Ragone, ‘The Gift of Life: Surro-
gate Motherhood, Gamete Donation and Constructions of Altruism’ in Cook
and others (eds), above n 12 at 209, for empirical research suggesting that
money is not the primary motivation.
71 Ibid, para 5.17. However, the Review also notes elsewhere that it had ‘seen no
evidence of such practices’ (para 4.7).
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prohibited,72 and predicted that the amount charged by surrogates for
their service would ‘increase exponentially’ if it were not, with the
additional negative consequence that this would be likely to cause the
incidence of surrogacy arrangements to rise,73 as well as risking
encouraging some women to ‘view surrogacy as a form of employ-
ment’.74 Conversely, the possibility that prohibiting payments would
decrease the number of women willing to act as surrogates was wel-
comed.75 Indeed, it has been suggested that the Committee’s intention
in limiting payments was precisely to discourage recourse to
surrogacy.76
Despite this distaste for surrogacy and recognition that the law was
not effective, the Brazier Review suggested only minor reforms with
regard to payment of surrogates. It recommended that the basis on
which payments ought to be made should be established by the
parties prior to entering a surrogacy arrangement, and that legislation
should both define lawful expenses and empower ministers to issue
directions on what kinds of expenses might be included and the
methods by which they should be evidenced.77 Compensation should
be permitted only for ‘genuine and verifiable’ expenses incurred as a
result of the pregnancy (e.g. maternity clothing, travel, insurance,
medical costs, medicines, and vitamins).78
These were modest proposals for reform and the Review showed keen
awareness of their limitations, specifically with regard to enforcement.
With the parties to an agreement not subject to criminal sanction, the
only real ‘teeth’ to be found in the Review’s recommendations lay in
the possibility that a future judge could refuse to issue a Parental
Order to formalise the intending parents’ relationship with the child.
However, in a situation where a couple is desperate for a child and sur-
rogacy involving payment is perceived as the only route to achieving
this, it is possible that the effect of this provision would be not to dis-
courage recourse to surrogacy but merely to leave couples with the
belief that formalisation of the parental role is impossible, an undesir-
able outcome for all concerned. Further, if couples do come to court,
judges face an impossible conflict. Where a child is thriving in the care
72 Ibid, para 5.21. Exploitation of surrogates by intending parents would simul-
taneously be reduced as ‘the absence of payment would reduce the likelihood
of undue pressure being placed on the surrogate mother’ (para 5.16).
73 Ibid, para 5.15.
74 Ibid, para 5.17.
75 Ibid, paras 4.37 and 5.22. See further, M Brazier, ‘Can You Buy Children?’
(1999) 11 (3) CFLQ 345.
76 Freeman, above n 39.
77 Brazier Review, para 7.11.
78 Ibid, para 5.25.
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of the intending parents, could a judge charged with prioritising child
welfare ever refuse a Parental Order on the basis that a payment had
been made?79
This issue continues to be a thorny problem and one which is yet more
marked in an era of growing ‘reproductive tourism’. In Re X & Y
(Foreign Surrogacy),80 a British couple paid an Ukranian surrogate
E235 per month during pregnancy and E25,000 on the birth of live
twins, so as to enable her to put down a deposit on a flat (expenses
which were lawful in the Ukraine). Although these payments significant-
ly exceeded mere ‘expenses’, Hedley J nonetheless authorised the pay-
ments so that a Parental Order could be made. He declared himself
‘most uncomfortable’ in doing so:
What the court is required to do is to balance two competing and
potentially irreconcilable concepts. Parliament is clearly entitled
to legislate against commercial surrogacy and is clearly entitled to
expect that the courts should implement that policy consideration
in its decisions. Yet it is also recognised that as the full rigour of
that policy consideration will bear on one wholly unequipped to
comprehend it let alone deal with its consequences (ie the child con-
cerned) that rigour must be mitigated by the application of a con-
sideration of that child’s welfare. That approach is both humane
and intellectually coherent. The difficulty is that it is almost impos-
sible to imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the case
comes to court, the welfare of the child (particularly a foreign child)
would not be gravely compromised (at the very least) by a refusal to
make an order.81
Only two years later, Hedley J faced the same problem in Re L, where a
British couple had entered into a commercial surrogacy arrangement in
Illinois, where there was no ceiling on payments. He again retroactively
authorised a payment despite the fact that it was clear that the amount
paid clearly exceeded ‘reasonable expenses’.82 The Court was obliged to
treat the child’s welfare as its paramount consideration, even when
79 Eg Re Adoption Application (Payment for Adoption) [1987] 3 WLR 31
(prior to the 1990 Act); Re Q (Parental Order) [1996] 1FLR 369, where
Johnson J found that payments could be sanctioned retrospectively as long
as they were ‘reasonable’ (at 374).
80 [2008] EWHC 3030. See also: Re C (Application by Mr and Mrs X under s
30 of the HFE Act 1990) [2002] EWHC 157.
81 At 24. Without a Parental Order, the children were at risk of being not just
parentless but also stateless: see further below.
82 Re L (a minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam), at 3.
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balanced against public policy considerations.83 While this ruling does
not change the law, it does mean that people who pay more expenses
know that ‘the chances are that those deals will be ratified afterwards’.84
With regard to the payment of surrogates, then, the Brazier Review
exposed problems that continue to dog the courts, particularly those
faced with deciding cases regarding cross-border surrogacy arrange-
ments. The Review’s suggested means of addressing the problem of en-
forcement was to make it impossible for a couple to apply for a
Parental Order unless they had complied with the statutory limitation
on payments.85 Yet, the tension between such a requirement and a
concern for child welfare would surely still see the judiciary searching
for creative means of leaving children with the intending parents. It is
difficult to see how the tension between the two ‘competing and po-
tentially irreconcilable concepts’ identified by Hedley J, above,86 can
be addressed without a different regulatory framework and, particular-
ly, without revisiting the ban on payments of surrogates, a matter that
was put beyond the Review’s remit. What appears necessary is a
further review that could consider a full range of reform possibilities.
After all, as we have discussed above, opinion regarding surrogacy has
continued to moved quickly since 1998 and the general goal that sur-
rogacy should be discouraged is still less self-evidently appropriate
today, given the further growth of acceptance of the practice in the
UK. It is worthy of note, too, that the HFEA has recently reviewed
a number of its current policies relating to sperm, egg, and embryo
donation, including the issue of whether payments (beyond just
expenses) to donors should be authorised, and ultimately opting to
increase compensation rates for egg donors up to a fixed sum of
£750 per cycle of egg donation.87 While the amount paid to egg
donors is clearly conceptualised as compensation, it is possible that
more open debate with regard to the payment of gamete donors
might equally presage a somewhat greater openness to the possibility
of payment of surrogates.
83 The need to treat the child’s welfare as paramount has since been confirmed in
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations 2010.
84 Natalie Gamble, cited in L Donnelly, ‘Surrogacy: The Brave New World of
Making Babies’ Daily Telegraph 22 January 2011.
85 Brazier Review, para 7.24.
86 See n 81.
87 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ‘Donating sperm and eggs:
have your say’ ,http://www.hfea.gov.uk/5605.html. (consultation closed
April 2011) and ‘HFEA agrees new policies to improve sperm and egg dona-
tion services’ (19 October 2011) ,http://www.hfea.gov.uk/6700.html.
(accessed 6 December 2011).
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Unlike the two other areas considered above, the question of parenthood
did not come explicitly within the Brazier Review’s terms of reference;
however, it nonetheless fell squarely within the Review Committee’s inter-
pretationof its remit,which it took to require examination of ‘how farexist-
ing legal principles . . . continue to be adequate and appropriate in 1998.’88
The attribution of legal parenthood following surrogacy raises signifi-
cant legal problems, which are by no means fully addressed by the avail-
ability of Parental Orders. The ‘status provisions’ of the 1990 Act, which
determine the legal parenthood following the use of regulated infertility
treatment services, were not designed with surrogacy in mind and have
led to some perverse results in this context. The 1990 Act enshrined the
common law position that the birth mother would be the legal mother,
making no exception for cases of full surrogacy, where the egg used to
conceive the pregnancy was not her own.89 These provisions further
provide that the surrogate mother’s husband is the legal father, unless it
can be shown that he did not give consent to her treatment. Where no
father is created by this provision, then another man could be considered
the legal father where he had received ‘treatment together’ with the
mother.90 The poor fit of these provisions for surrogacy is illustrated by
Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile).91 Here, a surrogate’s estranged
husband was the child’s legal father, because there was no evidence that
he had not consented to her treatment.92 However, his unwillingness to
reply to any correspondence meant that it was impossible to gain his
consent to a Parental Order, leaving the child in potential legal limbo.
The problematic fit of existing legal principles and surrogacy arrange-
ments is also raised in the context of parental leave, where it is the surro-
gate who is currently entitled to paid maternity leave.93
As we noted above, whoever is the legal parent of a child on birth, this
status can be extinguished by the granting of a Parental Order, which
can transfer parenthood to the intending parents in certain specified cir-
cumstances.94 Yet, there are a range of practical problems with the
process of applying for a Parental Order, which has been justly
88 Brazier Review, para 1.3.
89 S 27, the 1990 Act.
90 These provisions were completely rewritten in 2008 (see ss 33 and 35–7, the
2008 Act, respectively) but their spirit was nonetheless broadly retained: see J
McCandless and S Sheldon, ‘The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
(2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family Model’ (2010) 73(2) MLR 175.
91 [2007] EWHC 2814.
92 S 28(2) of the 1990 Act, now s 35 of the 2008 Act. See further McCandless
and Sheldon, above n 90.
93 See Evan Harris MP, HC Debs Cols 208–9 (10 June 2008).
94 S 54, the 2008 Act, replacing s 30, the 1990 Act.
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characterised as ‘overly restrictive’, ‘burdensome and complex’.95 The
application must be made in a Family Proceedings court, with the
Guardian ad litem charged with checking the existence of a genetic
link with one of the intending parents, confirming that no payment
(beyond reasonable expenses) has been made and with ensuring that
the child’s welfare is respected. However, as Jackson notes, the Guard-
ian faces two major problems with regard to the discharge of these
duties. First, her powers are very limited and she will only have
access to information provided by the surrogate and the intending
parents. Secondly, these duties are often not easily reconciled: for the
award of a Parental Order, the child must already be living with the
intending parents and her welfare will seldom be enhanced by removing
her from a settled home.96 As we noted above, in practice this means
that even if there has been an overt breach of prohibition on payments,
a child’s interests may still be best served by awarding a Parental
Order.97
The Brazier Review did not consider the more general issues regarding
the attribution of legal parenthood noted above, but it did review the
system of Parental Orders, recommending that a revised scheme
should be retained, but tightened so as to address some of these practical
problems. Proposals included that all applications for Parental Orders
should only be heard in the Family Division of the High Court, so
that approval might be ‘given by judges of the highest experience’;
that Orders should only be available after DNA testing had established
that at least one of the intending parents was genetically related to the
child; and that criminal record checks of the intending parents should
be allowed.98 These recommendations again reflect the Committee’s
suspicion of surrogacy and a desire to scrutinise it (and those who
make use of it) more closely. Again, none of the recommendations
were implemented.
On this issue, our analysis diverges from that of the Brazier Review:
while acknowledging the practical concerns above, we would rather
highlight a range of problems with the limitations imposed on the Par-
ental Order process, which seem to us to be unduly onerous. First, a Par-
ental Order is only obtainable within a specific and clearly delineated
time frame: after the first six weeks but within the first six months of
a child’s life.99 In Re X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), Hedley J notes that
95 E Jackson, above n 19, 273–5.
96 E Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials () (2nd edn OUP, Oxford
2010) 838.
97 See eg Re L [2010], above n 82.
98 Brazier Review, para 7.24.
99 Ss 54(7) and 57(3), the 2008 Act, respectively.
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‘apparently there is no power to extend though no specific reason can be
ascertained for that. That may especially cause problems where immi-
gration issues have led to delay’.100 Additionally, at the time of the ap-
plication, the child must be residing with the applicants, at least one of
whom must be domiciled in the UK, Channel Islands, or Isle of Man and
at least one of whom must be genetically related to the child.101 This last
requirement makes it impossible to achieve parenthood by Parental
Order if, for example, both parties are infertile. The fact that often
neither intending parent has any status at birth and therefore no author-
ity to make decisions about their child’s welfare until a court order has
been granted leaves some children particularly vulnerable. The situation
is potentially different where the surrogate is unmarried and the intend-
ing father’s sperm was used in an informal arrangement: here, the
genetic father will be the legal father. This raises a further danger:
that the law ‘will create an artificial demand for unmarried surrogate
mothers . . . regardless of whether they are the most suitable or well
supported’.102
Secondly, Parental Orders are available only to couples.103 Neither
the law nor the HFEA Code of Practice prevents single people using sur-
rogacy and single people can both adopt and be accepted for treatment
involving donor insemination or IVF. As such, it is unclear why Parental
Orders should be unavailable to them. The potentially discriminatory
nature of this provision was dismissed by the Government in debates
regarding the 2008 Act, on the basis that ‘being single has not been
recognised as a protected status for the purpose of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights’104 and couples are ‘best equipped’ to
handle the ‘magnitude’ of what happens in a surrogacy arrangement.105
These statements sit uneasily with the arguments relating to procreative
autonomy that held sway with regard to other elements of the reforms
introduced in 2008 and, specifically, single women’s access to infertility
treatment services.106 They also ignore a range of practical problems
100 [2008] EWHC 3030 at 12.
101 Ss 54(4) and 54(1), respectively.
102 N Gamble, ‘Why surrogacy law needs reviewing’ ,http://www.
nataliegambleassociates.com/page/surrogacy/39/. accessed 19 July 2011.
103 Since 2008, this includes all heterosexual and same sex couples, regardless of
marriage or civil partnership status: s 54(2), the 2008 Act.
104 HC Debs Col 210 (10 June 2008).
105 HC Debs Col 246–9 (10 June 2008).
106 Resulting in the removal of the requirement that clinicians consider the
child’s ‘need for a father’ when deciding who to treat under s 13(5) of the
1990 Act. See generally J McCandless and S Sheldon (2010) ‘“No Father
Required”? The Welfare Assessment in the Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Act’ (2008) 18(3) Feminist Legal Stud 201.
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facing intending parents: what will happen, for example, if the couple
separate or one partner dies during the progression of a surrogate
pregnancy?107 A failure to formalise the parenthood of an intending
(now sole) parent would appear to be in significant tension with the pro-
vision that the child’s welfare should be treated as paramount.108
Thirdly, the domicile requirement inevitably poses significant problems
in the context of the growing cross-border provision of healthcare. As our
discussion of Re L and Re X& Y illustrated, the practical problems with
surrogacy have been still furtherexacerbated by thegrowth of so-called ‘re-
productive tourism’ and such problems are not confined merely to the
problem of the larger payments that may be available overseas.109 These
issues have recently been highlighted again in Re IJ (A Child),110 where
Hedley J once more emphasised the legal difficulties that entering overseas
surrogacy arrangements can create, explaining that:
[a]ll overseas jurisdictions can confer parental status on the com-
missioning couple but that status is not recognised in our domestic
law nor (at least where a commercial agreement has been in place)
could it be. Those who travel abroad to make these arrangements
really should take advice from those skilled in our domestic law
to be sure as to the problems that will confront them (not the
least of which is immigration) and how they can be addressed. Re-
liance on advice from overseas agencies is dangerous as the provi-
sions of our domestic and immigration law are often not fully
understood.111
Again, ‘well meaning amateurs’ who run not-for-profit agencies may be
poorly equipped to provide this advice.112
While the Brazier Review had concentrated on the problems raised by
‘reproductive tourists’ travelling to the UK to obtain surrogacy services,
it failed to consider traffic in the other direction, with UK residents trav-
elling abroad to employ non-UK surrogates.113 Yet, given the
107 As tragically occurred in the case in A& anr v P & ors [2011] EWHC 1738
(Fam). The intending parents had applied for a Parental Order within the
timeframe but the father died before it was granted.
108 As the court in A & anr, ibid, recognised. Here, the intending mother was
acknowledged as the legal mother, despite an only 40% chance that she
was the biological mother, on the basis that this would best protect the
child’s welfare and human rights.
109 See eg N Gamble, ‘Crossing Borders for Surrogacy: the Problems for
Families and Policymakers’ 609 BioNews 31 May 2011.
110 [2011] EWHC 921 (Fam).
111 At 4.
112 See above n 52.
113 India is the largest and fastest growing marketplace for surrogacy, where it is
now reported to generate over £1.5 billion annually (Donnelly, above n 84).
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restrictions on payment in the UK and the lower costs of obtaining such
services elsewhere, it was perhaps always inevitable that this would
become a reality and raise significant and thorny issues.114 Specifically,
as Re IJ illustrates, problems occur where there is a disjuncture between
the law in the UK and the law in the destination country over the basic
question of who should be initially recognised as the child’s legal
parents. At the extreme, this can result in a child being born with no
legal parents at all and this, in turn, will raise immigration problems
if UK parents seek to bring a child home with them.115 As Gamble
notes: there is no straightforward way for English parents to apply for
entry clearance to bring their child into the UK under the immigration
rules and, in many cases, the child will be ‘stateless’ which means he
or she cannot even obtain a passport.116 As the worst case scenario,
the biological child of two English parents might be left parentless
and stateless in another country, with the parents unable to secure a
right to raise their own genetic child or to bring him or her into the
UK. Gamble has recently further written that:
Many parents still enter into foreign surrogacy arrangements
without being aware of the potential legal complications and
then find themselves stranded abroad facing a legal process which
is much more complicated than they had anticipated. Others
know of the difficulties and some choose not to engage with the
UK legal system at all (which is practically possible in certain scen-
arios, depending on the immigration position) thereby leaving their
family’s status entirely unsecured. Either way, children are being
put at risk and this is something we have a duty to take very
seriously.117
In summary, we have suggested that the current system regarding the
legal attribution of parenthood offers a poor fit for surrogacy and that
while the system of Parental Orders provides some possibility for intend-
ing parents to formalise their relationships with children, this system is
114 As Hedley J notes: ‘’[a]s babies become less available for adoption and given
the withdrawal of donor confidentiality . . . more and more couples are likely
to be tempted to follow the applicant’s path to commercial surrogacy in
those places where it is lawful’. Re X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008]
EWHC 3030 (Fam) at 26.
115 Eg Re X & Y, ibid; Re K (Minors: Foreign Surrogacy) [2010] EWHC 1180;
Re IJ (A Child) [2011] EWHC 921 (Fam).
116 N Gamble, ‘Why Surrogacy Law Needs an Urgent Review’ 455 BioNews 28
April 2008. Once a Parental Order is granted in the UK, if at least one of the
intending couple is a British citizen, the child will equally be deemed so: para
8.7, Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations
2010 No. 985.
117 Gamble, above n 109.
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significantly flawed. The Brazier Review’s recommendations here
focused on ways of tightening the operation of the Parental Order
schema (specifically with regard to payments). While recognising the
practical problems that motivated these proposals we have also outlined
various problems which, cutting against the Review’s recommendations,
would rather suggest the need for certain of the criteria used in the
granting of Parental Orders to be relaxed.
Again, however, no substantial reform has been forthcoming since
1990. While Parental Orders were revisited in the 2008 reforms
(notably, in order to extend their application to same sex and
unmarried heterosexual couples), other limitations were not addressed,
and the broader issues posed by surrogacy and parenthood were
ignored.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Janet Dolgin has argued that as the disruptive potential of assisted re-
productive technologies becomes increasingly apparent, ‘traditional
understandings of the family as a universe grounded in inexorable
truth begin to fall apart’ and, as a consequence, ‘some profoundly con-
servative impulse at the center of culture asserts itself in opposition’.118
If this is so, then it should also be true that as a practice becomes more
familiar, it should simultaneously also become less threatening, with the
result that a ‘conservative impulse’ to rein it in will lose some of its force.
Dolgin’s insight offers a useful way of thinking about surrogacy in the
UK. An increasing acceptance of the practice is evident in more positive
reports in the press,119 including stories of ‘celebrity endorsements’ of
surrogacy by, inter alia, Nicole Kidman and Elton John.120 It can be
tracked across successive judicial decisions concerning surrogacy,
which have more recently avoided references to the practice as ‘sad
and miserable’, ‘sordid’, and ‘ugly’,121 in favour of judgments that
eschew any comment on the morality of surrogacy arrangements.
Indeed, as early as 1985, in Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy),
the judge specifically rejected the idea that having entered into a surro-
gacy arrangement was a sign that the intending parents would be bad
118 J Dolgin, ‘The “Intent” of Reproduction: Reproductive Technologies and
the Parent-Child Bond’ (1994) 26(4) Connecticut Law Rev 1261, 1313.
119 Eg the positive tone of Anon, ‘Sisters make baby with three mums’, ,http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4370804.stm. 18 January 2011.
120 Anon, ‘Sir Elton John becomes father via surrogate’ (28 December 2010)
,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-12084650.; anon,
‘Nicole Kidman announces baby born through surrogate’ ,http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-12213615. 18 January 2011.
121 A v C (1978) 8 Fam Law 170; [1985] FLR 445.
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parents.122 Finally, the growing acceptance of surrogacy can also be
tracked across official reports and Government interventions.
The Brazier Review was significantly less hostile to surrogacy than
the Warnock Report123 and, indeed, discussion of surrogacy in the
debates around the 2008 Act reveal a still higher level of acceptance.124
Seen in this light, the Brazier Review is of interest, not just for what we
can learn from its careful consideration of the issue of surrogacy and the
problems in its regulation, but also as a historical document: a snapshot
of prevailing attitudes at the time. The attitudes which underpin the
views expressed in it, perhaps most notably the broad assumptions
regarding the evils of paid surrogacy and likely detriment to any child
born following a paid arrangement, are a product of their time.
Today, while those views and concerns still resonate with many, the
regulation of surrogacy nonetheless might appear increasingly out of
line with more permissive public views. None of this is to deny that sur-
rogacy raises significant ethical questions, which merit close scrutiny. It
is, however, to suggest that in so far as the law is grounded in a desire to
discourage surrogacy as an inherently undesirable practice, it is possible
that this goal is now out of step with popular opinion.
As we have described above, the current law governing surrogacy is
also subject to criticism on a range of fronts. The regulatory framework
is fragmented, incoherent, and ‘still hazy after all these years’. As we have
suggested, the stark practical distinctions in the regulation of full and
partial surrogacy are difficult to justify, and the ‘regulatory vacuum’ in
which the latter often operates leaves individuals dependent on the
efforts of ‘well meaning amateurs’, who are prevented from charging
the fees that would otherwise allow them to professionalise their services.
The law relating to the attribution of legal parenthood is poorly designed
to respond to surrogacy arrangements. Further, while Parliament has
clearly long been concerned to prohibit payments to surrogates, its
attempt to entrench such a prohibition lacks legal teeth and cuts
against concerns for child welfare, with the result that the law is visibly
ineffective. Finally, serious problems are posed by the growth in ‘repro-
ductive tourism’. And it might be noted here that, insofar as the purported
justification for the current regulatory regime is grounded in a concern for
vulnerable parties, this concern should surely fall into still sharper focus
in the context of cross-border provision of surrogacy. The possibility of
122 Re C (a minor) (Wardship; surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846; [1985] Fam
Law 191.
123 Warnock has since changed her views and accepted the case for regulation:
M Warnock, Making Babies: Is There a Right to Have Children? (Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2002) 92.
124 Eg HL Debs Vol 698 Cols 471–3 (28 January 2008).
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any oversight of the treatment of, say, an Indian surrogate, is highly
limited, as is the possibility to protect the interests of the intending
parents who have travelled out of the jurisdiction, and the children
born within such arrangements. It seems to us that there is thus an over-
whelming case for a fundamental review of the law of surrogacy.
It might be suggested that the 2008 reform process was never an ap-
propriate vehicle for such a review. The 2008 Act was an amending
statute, working outwards from what was already in place and therefore
poorly equipped to offer a platform for thorough and radical reform.125
Moreover, the task of overseeing the redrawing of the legislation fell to a
Government Department—Health—that does not have central responsi-
bility for law and policy relating to the family and which was therefore
reluctant to consider radical change to the provisions regarding parent-
hood.126 Nonetheless, it was claimed that the 2008 Act would bring the
regulation of assisted reproductive technologies up to date, rendering it
‘fit for purpose’ in the twenty-first century127 and, with regard to surro-
gacy, it has signally failed in this task. Indeed, the lack of meaningful en-
gagement with surrogacy can only confirm a more general frustration
with the Act’s failure to offer a root and branch reform. The changes
to the regulation of surrogacy introduced in 2008 were minimal,
failing to consider more fundamental questions regarding the shortcom-
ings of the current regulatory regime and why (and whether) a continued
prohibition on payments is either morally justified or practically sustain-
able. A critique of the legislation as ‘tinkering with the existing legal
provisions rather than going back to first principles and seeking to
take an overall view of where to go in the next fifteen years’,128 thus
seems particularly apposite in this context.129
What of the future? It has been suggested at various times (and most
recently by the pre-legislative scrutiny committee in 2007) that the
HFEA might play a more central role in the regulation of surrogacy.
While this suggestion was never welcomed by the HFEA, it now looks
likely to be rendered entirely redundant by the Government’s plans to
abolish the Authority by the end of this Parliament, dispersing its
functions to a range of other bodies.130 Whilst cutting against the
125 See generally, McCandless and Sheldon, above n 90.
126 Ibid.
127 Department of Health, Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act: A Public Consultation (DoH, London 2005).
128 Joint Committee, above n 55, para 44.
129 See further, K Horsey, ‘Swept under the carpet: Why surrogacy law needs
urgent review’ in A Wrigley and N Priaulx (eds), Ethics, Law & Society
(Ashgate, Aldershot, 2011).
130 Department of Health, Liberating the NHS: Report of the Arm’s-Length
Bodies Review (DoH, London 2010).
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grain of ‘rationalisation’ of regulatory bodies with a view to decreasing
their number, this would nonetheless leave the field open for consider-
ation of a specific regulatory body charged with overseeing surrogacy.
Or, perhaps more realistically in a post ‘Bonfire of the Quangos’ land-
scape, The Review’s suggested system of registration of not-for-profit
agencies, possibly overseen by the Care Quality Commission, remains
worthy of serious consideration.131
In conclusion, we would suggest that the time is right for a sustained
review process operating without the constraints imposed on the remit
of the Brazier Review and offering the possibility of reform which
goes beyond merely ‘tinkering at the edges’. Such a review could con-
sider afresh the key ethical questions that should inform the regulation
of surrogacy and attempt to build a law that represents the best possible
response to them. It would undoubtedly face difficult ethical questions
and would need to work in a way that was carefully grounded in a
detailed understanding of the empirical realities of surrogacy practice,
as it happens both within the UK and, importantly, across borders.132
After all, the existence of cross-border provision should greatly heighten
concerns regarding exploitation where surrogacy services are provided
in countries where women may not have access to the same health ser-
vices and legal protections as in the UK. Further, concerns regarding the
possible harms suffered by intending parents are greater still where such
individuals feel left with no alternative but to travel to other countries
and navigate their way through foreign legal and health care systems
and domestic immigration rules. Most crucially, if the central concern
of a good law is to protect the welfare of the child, this is surely not
best achieved by exporting surrogacy, yet this is the almost inevitable
consequence of our current regime. While any changes to the UK law
are unlikely to yield any means of overseeing surrogacy arrangements
that occur oversees, it is at least possible that making surrogacy services
more readily available in the UK would reduce the incidence of cross-
border arrangements. And at the very least, a review could reconsider
the law relating to the recognition of legal parenthood in the light of
the specific problems caused by cross-border arrangements and UK par-
enthood regulations. It was with some foresight that Margaret Brazier
wrote in 1999 that: ‘[t]he international ramifications of the reproductive
business may prove to be a more stringent test of the strength of British
law than all the different ethical dilemmas that have gone before’.133
131 Anon, ‘Quango list shows 192 to be axed’. ,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-politics-11538534. accessed 25 July 2011.
132 See generally, ,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-14138394. accessed
28 July 2011.
133 Brazier, above n 23, p 193.
Med. L. Rev. The Law Regulating Surrogacy 89
 by guest on M
arch 5, 2012
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
